af40's Blog

Congressional Democrats and both of the Democratic presidential candidates realize that the Iraq War will be a major plus for them come November. In the past, unpopular wars have been major assets to the political opposition: Nixon, among the Democratic turmoil that was 1968, won largely on a platform that consisted of opposition to the Vietnam War. (The fact that the war did not end until seven years later is another matter). So it strikes no one as surprising that at almost every opportunity- whether in a Senate Armed Services hearing or in response to a presidential speech- Democrats are taking shots at the war's failures.

However, there is a difference between doing what seems to be the politically expedient thing and what is actually the right thing. What Democrats today are saying is so shockingly simplistic that it causes one to take pause and to consider whether or not they have really given any degree of serious consideration to its consequences. Simply put, Democrats want an end to the war..yesterday.

Let me clarify one thing, as I usually do when I comment on this highly unpopular war: I have always felt it was a war based on a flimsy "preemptive" rationale. Moreover, the lack of troop armor and sufficient troop levels is largely to blame for the current mess- and many of the tragic lives lost to IEDs. No one can doubt that this war has been botched up badly from start to finish.

But we face a choice now in the fifth year of a nearly interminable war: we can turn around and pack up, leaving behind a highly perilous situation that were it not for American troops might boil over into a full-scale civil war, and in the process will signal that the thousands of American soldiers who have died, died in vain, or we can finish the job. And finishing the job here is not merely a matter of national pride or redemption: if we do pull out- yesterday- we will leave behind a vacuum which no doubt will be filled by Iran's expansive, ultra-radical shadow. We will have, in fact, caused Iraq to be a more dangerous place than it was before 2003.

Statistically, the troop surge has been a dramatic success. For example, while troop mortality averaged 70-80 American lives a month before the surge (and had actually started to climb just before it), in the year since it has plummeted to just half that many, about 30-40. The nearly perfect negative correlation is clear and leaves little doubt as to causality. Yet this should make all politicians- Democrats and Republicans alike- take pause and consider the fact that maybe, just maybe, if the surge had been accomplished sooner, fewer American soldiers would be dying today.

General David Petraeus has signaled that a scale-back of troops below pre-surge levels is not likely to happen soon. In fact, Democrats view the President's stance as signaling a continuation of the war, full speed ahead. But they fail to account for the fact that the surge has been a success, and to draw down troop levels now, just when things are improving, might take us back to where we were before the surge- and all the needless lives we lost.

Democrats especially must stop the political maneuvering and "out-besting" on calls for a troop pullout. Perhaps John McCain is not responding to the heart and soul of an American public that is weary of a difficult war, but neither is Hillary Clinton nor Barack Obama responding to the dedicated minds who have revealed that for once, the contrarian view- increasing troop levels- is actually the smart thing to do.

On October 11, 2002, 12:50 am Eastern Standard Time, one hundred US Senators sat in a full Capitol chamber, eagerly awaiting the results of what by then was already a foregone conclusion: that the Iraq War resolution would pass by a wide margin. But the real question on most of the Senators' minds that night was not the end result but exactly who would vote against giving President Bush the authority to wage war against Saddam Hussein and Iraq. Voting 'Nay' was widely perceived then as tempting political suicide.

The final tally, 77 Yeas to 23 Nays, was a telling sign of the times, a time when National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice was telling Americans of potentially impending "mushroom clouds", Vice President Cheney was warning of the links of Saddam Hussein to Islamic terrorism and even 9/11, largely on the basis of circular leaks to the press (his office would leak false intel to the press just prior to his Sunday morning TV appearances, and then report it as third-party corroborative evidence), and Colin Powel was getting ready for a momentous UN speech where he'd outline evidence (now proven false) that Saddam had tried to procure uranium from Africa.

Over five-and-a-half years later, Americans know that a significant amount of the information they were told during those heady fall '02 days was false, and a significant proportion of those feel they were misled on purpose.

Of the Senators who sat in the chamber that October day, several would eventually go on to run for national public office. John Kerry of Massachusetts, who would become the surprise nominee of the Democratic Party in 2004, went against the opinion of his fellow senior state colleague, Senator Ted Kennedy, and voted 'Yea'.

In fact, nearly all the Democratic Senators who would run in the 2004 election- Lieberman (D-CT), Edwards (D-NC), Kerry (D-MA)- voted in favor of the resolution. A lone Bob Graham (D-Fl) was the only Senator to run for the 2004 Democratic nomination who voted against the resolution.

 

In hindsight, the Iraq War resolution is certainly viewed as a mistake among the vast majority of Democrats as well as many Republicans, and thusly a majority of Americans. But in late 2002, the Bush bandwagon seemed the safest place to be. President Bush was not only extremely popular- he'd recently waged a successful war against the Taliban in Afghanistan that helped train some of the 9/11 hijackers- but he was still enjoying an "era of good feelings" that stretched across partisan lines. And, more importantly, Americans firmly believed that Saddam Hussein was somehow linked to 9/11. Surely, most of the early 2004 hopefuls thought, voting 'Yea' was the best option. Few people could imagine that the Iraq War would still go on even into the second election cycle following 9/11. But that is the power of hindsight.

 

Yet what about Hillary Clinton? In 2004, Hillary had been a US Senator for just under two years- about the same amount of time Senator Barack Obama was in office before he launched his presidential campaign. A fresh face in a Senate where many faces were old- it was a time when a nearly centenarian Strom Thurmond (R-SC) had struck his almost final vote in a career spanning over five decades- Hillary Clinton seemed to be in no position to go against the grain and boldly vote 'Nay'.

 

Or at least that is what most of her advisers probably told her at the time. In the years since her 2002 vote, Hillary has proven one thing quite evidently: far from being the maverick she had once appeared to be, as the first First Lady to champion significant national legislation with her 1993 healthcare proposal, she has actually proven to be a down-the-middle, moderate Democratic Senator. The highly touted fears in 2000 by her opponents that she'd become some left-wing extremist once in office proved unfounded. In a Congress dominated by Republicans, and with strong support for a Conservative ideologue President, being moderate, and supporting the "war on terror"- which included Iraq at the time- was the safest place to be. And Hillary was there.

 

But at a time when Congress is no longer Republican, and the President is viewed as nearly a lame a duck as his father was in 1992, and most importantly, a time when the Iraq War is one of the most unpopular wars in US history, being moderate somehow seems dated, and Hillary is now on the outs with many Democrats. 

 

This is somewhat peculiar at first glance because most of the Democrats who disagree with her 2002 vote disagree not so much on her capacity to lead- she has, in fact, a slight edge on Obama when it comes to foreign policy matters- but on her unwillingness to be contrite and straightforward, to apologize for a vote that every other former Democratic candidate apologized for a long time ago.   

 

The fact that Hillary has never uttered the "s" word for sorry, or even a simple "I regret", has caused a lot of Democrats to see her as the very political opportunist most Republicans had long pegged her out to be. After all, argued those like uber-conservative and talking head Rush Limbaugh, why else would she stick by an obvious philanderer like her husband Bill, unless she simply wanted to use his coat tails for herself at some later point? Many Democrats refused to see her as a political opportunist in January 1998, when the allegations of her husband's impropriety with former intern Monica Lewinsky broke news. Many remember her devout protestations against the media- her near-heckles against the so-called "vast right-wing conspiracy" that was out to get her husband on an appearance on the 'Today Show'- and viewed them as an example of her strong marital devotion. She was a deeply hurt woman for many Democrats, especially women, and her ability to stand firm in a trying time showed that she was all the more fit to hold office herself some day.

 

But that view has been tarnished in the eyes of many once strong supporters, and one of the main reasons has been her refusal to show her own contrition, as much as her husband had once refused to show his, for a decision that is now a political hot potato. The fact that she has yet to apologize for her vote - she has thus far alleged that many were "misled" but has not taken personal responsibility- makes her singular Democratic opponent, Barack Obama, seem fresh and even profoundly visionary, by comparison. Although Barack Obama was only a state senator from Illinois at the time of the 2002 vote, he had made public his disagreement with the war at the time. Of course, as a state senator, one is much more insulated from the national pressures that befall a US Senator.

 

In fact, Hillary Clinton's attacks on Obama- that he has not gotten his feet wet in the tumultuous waters that are foreign policy- is a legitimate argument against a Senator who has barely completed the bulk of one term.  But this doesn't insulate Hillary herself for her bad choices.

 

Had Hillary been a more dynamic and engaging candidate- perhaps even a little more in the populist vein of a John Edwards- who has apologized for his 'Yea' vote- she might get away with a little more. But the fact that she comes off as stiff, rehearsed, and formulaic, causes many younger Democratic voters to see her as just part of that rigidly parochial Washington establishment that has failed them so miserably. By contrast, the youthful, hip, energetic and off-the-cuff Obama appears to embody the Kennedy-esque ideals, of new visions and new frontiers, and certainly, much needed change.

 

Once holding on to a commanding lead in public opinion polls all across the US, Hillary now has a razor-thin lead nationally, but lags far behind in many states individually.

 

In Texas- home to the Alamo- and where many argue Hillary could have her own last stand, she is barely a few points ahead of Obama. This state is critical for her hopes because not only does it have a lot of delegates, but it operates by proportional voting, meaning that even a one or two point win will amount to nothing more than a Pyrrhic victory. On the other hand, in almost all the states he has won, Obama has won by wide margins, giving him a sizeable lead in contested delegates. If he continues to have successes, many of Hillary's pledged "super" delegates might jump ship, diminishing her tally by several hundred votes while giving Obama the right to claim both an electoral and a political mandate.

 

Things might very well turn in Hillary's favor in places like Ohio and Pennsylvania, where bread-and-butter union support might swing in her favor. But even that once solid blue collar support has been whittled away by the Obama charge. Unlike Clinton, Obama speaks about the damage NAFTA has caused so many American workers and its once world-class industries, about the export of American jobs to places like China and India, about corporate greed, and about endless back-room lobbying in the halls of Washington. Clinton's husband was the prime supporter of NAFTA, and it was under his tenure that the first major wave of outsourcing, and the concomitant corporate corruption, began.  As with Gore in 2000, Bill Clinton might end up being the spoiler, but for somewhat different reasons.    

 

In 2000, Gore had ignored Clinton's pledge to campaign, as at the time the impeachment proceedings made the once-popular president seem to be a problematic choice on the campaign trail. Many political scientists believe that Gore's decision to diminish Clinton's prominence in his campaign was a mistake, because Clinton was still very popular among many moderate Democrats who liked his performance on critical domestic issues.

Eight years later, it might be Clinton's over-campaigning, and especially his negative-sounding rhetoric, that might come off as unpalatable to Democrats yearning for a break with the past. If Hillary won in 2000 largely on her husband's seemingly undying Democratic popularity, she might end up losing because she hasn't yet come to terms with the end of that crumbling Camelot. 

 

But Hillary can blame no one but herself if she loses. Whether or not her husband Bill uses the race card, or makes foolish comments about Obama's preparedness, is of less consequence to Democratic voters than her own image. She cannot cast herself in the image of someone like Obama, because that is not who she is. But Americans have never demanded that their leaders be who they are not, or perfect for that matter.    

 

Most Americans accepted the rather parochial, stiff Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the US forces in Europe in World War II, because that is who he was, and being a strong father figure was a good thing for an era when America's dominance was still uncertain. They accepted the nervous, brooding Nixon- Eisenhower in fact couldn't stand him personally- because he had proven himself strong on communism, and he seemed to be just what was needed in a time of seeming lawlessness and social disarray. Americans have never had a specific "type" when it comes to presidents, even if the great or near-great ones like FDR, Kennedy, and Reagan have tended to evoke a special optimism that their less stellar counterparts have not evoked.  

 

Americans are a forgiving people, and they certainly accept that their leaders aren't perfect. They accepted, for example, the fact that Texas Governor George W. Bush was once an alcoholic and drug user. But Bush wisely and immediately came to light with the facts about his problems, and admitted his mistakes. What could have sunk his own campaign became a quick non-issue because he simply apologized. 

 

Hillary Clinton can yet earn back some of the support she has lost if she simply tells Americans, "I am sorry, I was wrong in my vote to authorize the Iraq War." She doesn't even need to qualify her apology, or to say that "Everyone else made the same mistake." For one, everyone else did not make that mistake. But more importantly, lots of people did make that mistake, and they were forgiven for it. It is better to make a mistake and learn from it- which is what an apology represents to begin with- than to ignore it and fail to appear to have learned from it. Saying "I'm sorry" will show that she isn't but an opportunist, but a contrite human being who recognizes that much has been lost to a bad decision that she was once a part of.

 

Even the greatest figures in history have made remarkably bad mistakes. Lincoln was a great politician, but an awful Commander in Chief. Yet we don't remember so much his military losses because he won the bigger war.  In an era where brand imaging, focus groups, and polling seem to be the most important assets in a politician's war chest, it seems almost counterintuitive that basic honesty and human forgiveness should curry greater public support.   

 

Then again, it may be the case that all the polls and focus groups fail to summarize what one's gut feeling about a person can summarize in an instant.   More and more people are drawn to Obama because he comes off as natural, comfortable, and honest. For Hillary to have a chance to win the nomination, she must do what for her is the most difficult thing in the world: to admit she was wrong. To admit mistakes sometimes takes the greatest courage.

Mitt Romney's drop out of the presidential race this week left John McCain as the only realistic hopeful for the Republican nomination. While John McCain has been harshly criticized by staunch conservatives for his moderate views on issues like immigration, campaign finance reform, and the environment, as well as his frequent sponsorship of bipartisan bills in the Senate, he will no doubt begin to cement his base and the support of even those who initially might have waited for a cold day in Hell before voting for him. Republicans traditionally tend to unite, even after strong divisions during primaries. That’s exactly what McCain did in 2000 when a young George W. Bush trounced him in South Carolina, and that is exactly what other Republicans like Romney will do for McCain now.

But the Democrats have often seen greater intra-party division during primaries, and this year that division is likely only to grow. In both 1968 and 1972, years when the VietNam War was on American’s minds, nominees did not surface until several rounds of voting at the national conventions. Even then, the ultimate nominees, Humphrey in 1968 and McGovern in 1972, were seen as controversial long shot dark horses (side note: it was Nixon’s unfounded paranoia about the Democrats in 1972 that led to the whole Watergate mess to begin with). Because of so much rancor and the desire- justified in view of past divisions- that the process become more efficient, the Democrats finally decided by 1984 to change their nomination system in two significant ways.

First, rather than giving all delegates to a state’s winner, each candidate would be guaranteed at least one delegate if he or she obtained at least 15% of the primary vote. Many states eventually adopted a proportional representation system to fit in with this. Secondly, superdelegates- political big shots basically- could vote in favor of any nominee. While these delegates would not have to commit to one nominee, it was thought that they could break any potential deadlock during a convention, thus avoiding the highly unpalatable “smoke-filled rooms” scenario of past conventions, a scenario where side-deals and even underhanded tactics behind closed doors once elected nominees.

Unfortunately, the system enacted in 1984 might actually create the very problems it was intended to remedy.

Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama finished in a virtual dead heat this past Tuesday, owing to the fact that each gained delegates even in states where they lost to the other. Had the system been more like that of the Republicans, where winner-take-all systems are more prevalent, it’s highly likely Hillary Clinton would be significantly closer to clinching the nomination. (And, conversely, Mitt Romney might still be in the race had he won a share of the winner-take-all Republican state delegates).

Instead, both Obama and Clinton gained a significant number of delegates, bringing Obama within 100 delegates of Clinton (and, in fact, narrowing her lead). If the process continues- and there is little chance either candidate will score a knockout blow anytime soon- it’s quite possible that the nomination might have to be decided at the convention, which is little more than two months before the national election.

A significant problem faced by Democrats is that a number of key states like Florida and Michigan, which already had their primaries, had their delegates scrapped as punishment by the Democratic Party for moving their primaries up too early. This is another critical loss for Hillary Clinton, because she did very well in both states (although in fairness, Obama did not campaign in either state, which means he might have done better had these states counted and had he campaigned there). If the final tally after all 50 states have had their primaries or caucuses shows a virtual dead heat, Florida (yes Florida!) will once again become that pesky state that ruined things.

If all this were to actually happen, those superdelegates would become major players, something that they have not been in the 24 years since the system was created. Unfortunately, superdelegates are not required to vote any one way, and they can change their votes even if they initially commit to one candidate (both Obama and Clinton have commitments from these delegates, but these aren’t set in stone). The problem is that if the two candidates do end up tied at the convention, and delegates jump ship, the losing candidate will cry foul. The whole process would reek of the old smoke-filled room scenario.

Historically, Democrats have tended to fare badly when they are divided at the convention. 1968 and 1972 are prime examples of this. And even in 1984, Democrats faced the challenge of whether to nominate former Carter VP Walter Mondale or Colorado Senator Gary Hart, both of whom had nearly as many delegates but who differed in the superdelegate tally. It was Mondale’s superdelegate superiority that eventually clinched his nomination.

Mondale went on to lose by the largest Electoral College vote margin in history:525 (for Reagan) to 13 (Mondale’s home state of Minnesota gave him 12, plus 1 delegate from D.C.). Hopefully this time around, the Democrats won’t end up basing the nomination on superdelegates.

It's kind of funny to see this year's crop of candidates attacking each other on records that might make them nationally appealing. Romney has attacked McCain on his willingness to work with moderates on bills concerning climate change and campaign fundraising reform, while McCain has made light of the former Mass. governor's socially friendly policies- such as legislation concerning abortion and gay rights- and his lukewarm support for a phased troop withdrawal (interpreted by many Republicans as "defeatist"). A Romney attack upon McCain stating that the Senator would not appoint a Supreme Court nominee like Samuel Alito- who is considered socially conservative- drew harsh denials by the McCain camp. McCain has struck back by stating Romney had refused to join high-profile Republicans attacking John Kerry during the 2004 Democratic Convention in Boston.

Mike Huckabee has likewise alluded to both McCain's and Romney's moderate positions in the Senate and the Governor's office, respectively, attempting to come off as the "true" family-and-religious-values-strong candidate. Yet even Huckabee has been attacked for seeming weak on law enforcement (via a claim that he willfully paroled an inmate who later on killed a woman while on parole) and his social spending policies as governor.  Weakness on law enforcement and liberal spending policies are big "no no's" for Republicans.

On the other side of the political aisle, both Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama have attacked each other for coming off as too Conservative- Obama attacked Hillary on her support for the Iraq War and Hillary has made allusions to Obama's comments in support of President Reagan, the pillar by which it seems all modern Republicans are compared.

I find it refreshing- not unappealing- that front-of-the-pack candidates like McCain and Romney on one side, and Clinton and Obama on the other, are actually not hardcore ideologues, but really just pragmatic political realists that just happen to identify with one ideology over another. Their moderate stances actually show that they are capable of working with political opponents- which is exactly what is needed to remove gridlock in Washington. That is, it is exactly what is needed to effect that magical word of this year's campaign season, "change".

Yet in the game of partisan politics, the type of game that primaries are all about, attacking an opponent even for the slightest hint that he or she might actually be a political moderate is very effective.  But this translates into candidates being forced to take ideological positions that are near the extremes of the political spectrum. 

Take Romney's position on gays in the military and abortion rights.

As Massachusetts governor, Romney was in favor of Clinton's "don't ask, don't tell" policy on gays in the military. This policy has worked quite well and it is viewed as striking a careful balance between outright denial of military admission for gays and outright approval of the gay lifestyle. But among Republicans, this decision is much less popular, seeming almost to betray the traditional "value" of considering the gay lifestyle as a sinful choice. Romney has since distanced himself from that position, calling it a "mistake". Likewise, Romney's pro-choice stance has since become "pro-life", yet another so-called mistake for the governor.

Nationally, Americans tend to support the Clinton policy on gays in the military and are almost split right down the middle on abortion rights. Americans are also much more attracted to, on average, candidates who have shown that they can work with political opponents. Ironically, the attacks candidates have made on each other claiming that opponents have been too bi-partisan while in office would be strong points in a national election. But in the primaries, anything remotely "friendly" to the opponent's party is fodder for attacks.

Candidates can afford to take more radical positions during the primaries because by the time a general election comes around, voters have already largely made up their minds if they are highly partisan, and the moderates (the independents) tend to be much less critical of partisan choices made during primaries. For example, moderates themselves are not generally issue-based ideologues, so they can vote for a candidate whose stance on an issue like abortion or gay rights differs from them.  Furthermore, many candidates tend to come closer to the middle, ideologically speaking, during the general campaign, oftentimes drawing attacks from opponents as being "on the fence" or wish-washy (this brings to mind John Kerry's claim in 2004 that he was in favor of an increase in war funding- $87 billlion worth- before he voted "against it". Kerry had clearly tried to come off as dually pro and anti-war, and he later on paid a heavy price for this).

While partisan rhetoric makes for lots of fanfare and great press during primaries, which is all repeated again during the coronation ceremony that we know of as party conventions, it is almost never effective in eliciting moderate support. The end result is that all the heated political rhetoric that is chimed during the primary season will likely fall only on partisan ears.  It consolidates one's base, which is undoubtedly the key to winning the party's nomination, but it does nothing to help candidates win a general election, where the base is already strongly in either one or the other camp.

This year is unique in that not only is there no incumbent in the run for national office, but even among the current candidates there does not seem to be any clear front-runner on either side. All of this might be decidedly more clear in a week from now, when several key states hold primaries.  But if the primary season does stretch all the way to the late summer conventions, it remains to be seen whether moderates will increasingly tune out of the political process, leaving behind an election that yet again falls along standard partisan divides.

 

 

I'm not sure if many people remember what happened to John McCain during the 2000 primary season. Like this year, McCain had won the New Hampshire primary and for a while after that he looked like the Republican Party's frontrunner.  But his surge fizzled when supporters of G.W. Bush's flagging campaign decided the time was ripe for some good ol' fashioned Southern "hospitality", dirty campaign trick style.

 As the 2000 South Carolina primary approached (South Carolina is notable for being the first southern primary, along with having a deep-seated love for its Confederate-flag covered trucks), thousands of e-mails and fliers started popping up in people's mailboxes accusing McCain of fathering an illegitimate baby with an African-American woman. Other e-mails claimed Cindy McCain, his wife, had been a drug addict. Now, I ask you to note a few interesting aspects about these vicious attacks.

First, it's clear South Carolina probably has not moved beyond its racist, segregationist past. It's not enough to claim that McCain had an illegitimate child (a ridiculous claim), but that, "on top of it all", the child is part African-American. Only in a state like South Carolina, right? Secondly, the claim that Cindy McCain had used illicit drugs is not only irrelevant (even if true, which it was not, it would have no bearing on her husband's capacities), it is most ironic because it was an accusation launched by friends of G.W. Bush, who himself admittedly had numerous problems with drugs and alcohol. Finally, and again ironically, it appears these mailings were sent by a professor at Bob Jones University. If you know anything about this charming little southern school, it is the place where Jesus Christ, xenophobia, latent segregationist fervor and racism seem to merge into an odd mix of holdout antebellum nostalgia and yearnings for "better times", as Trent Lott might say. African-American students were not even allowed admission here until 1971- well after the landmark Brown case and passage of the 60's civil rights laws.

Needless to say, McCain eventually lost the SC primary, and the nomination, as Bush sailed through the remainder of the southern states on exaggerated Christian zeal and an odd claim to "superior" moral credentials (his own personal demons were conveniently cast aside or downplayed).  McCain was too honorable to highlight Bush's very real personal limitations.

So in the end, John McCain, a true war hero who spent nearly 6 years of his young life in the infamous "Hanoi Hilton", a man who actually volunteered to go to VietNam (his father, an Admiral, could easily have found a quiet, safe desk job for him) was beaten by an opponent whose life was marked mostly by youthful transgressions, academic mediocrity, and financial failure.   

 Now fast-forward eight tumultuous years. McCain, as in 2000, is in a relatively strong position following his New Hampshire win. But also as in 2000, we are seeing some of the same dirty tricks being launched against the aging Senator.

 This time around there is one notable difference. We have definitive proof of who's actually slinging the mud: a Colorado-based company by the name of "Common Sense Issues" (CSI?) that conducts automated push-poll calls to registered voters.  A push poll is a campaign ad disguised as a "poll", in which leading questions are asked designed to encourage a specific impression, usually a bad one, about a political candidate.

Although the state's attorney general has denounced the company's tactics and is questioning its legality, the damage may have already been done ("CSI" is no doubt a member of the esteemed club to which "Swift Boat Veterans for Truth" belongs).

 

A few of the little gems that listeners were treated to in the past few days:

   

"Fact: McCain voted to allow scientific experiments to be done on unborn children."

   

"[John McCain created] the most restrictive assault on free speech ever passed in America" [with McCain-Feingold, the law that tightens rules on campaign contributions, and is ironically designed to cut down on dirty campaign tactics].

 

To be fair, I should add that CSI is not launching its underhanded attacks only against McCain. Apparently, callers are first asked whom they support, and if the answer is not Mike Huckabee, they are given a series of talking points on why their favored candidate is incompetent to lead America. The only candidate that seems to come off with flying colors is the former Arkansas governor himself.

 

Now, there's an old saying about the Mafia. If you want to find out who started a mob war, you look for the guy who's still standing after everyone else is shot dead. It's not hard to deduce (even for a South Carolinian) who's still standing here: Huckabee himself.

 

And to think, all of this time I was getting these good vibes from the jovial, guitar-playing former Baptist minister who has made frequent appearances on the 'The Colbert Report', a show known for its light-hearted brand of humor and general sense of optimism. Huckabee, for his part, denies any involvement in the calls.

   

Now I want to give Huck' the benefit of doubt here and say that it's not his fault that some overzealous supporters have crossed the line of civility, ethics, and probably even legality.  But I am reminded of GW Bush's failure to act both in 2000, when the first McCain attacks were launched, and in 2004, when decorated VietNam vet John Kerry was dragged through the mud by the now-infamous swift boat vet ads. Those latter ads probably diminished Kerry's votes among undecided voters just enough to make a difference. They also launched a new term ("to swift boat"), representing down-and-dirty- but effective- ad hominems.

 

In politics, failure to denounce attacks upon one's opponent is tantamount to tacit approval, and Bush certainly benefited from his failure to act.  If Huckabee will refuse to staunchly condemn the vicious attacks of a group like CSI, he will turn out to be just another shallow Christian demagogue, claiming a stake to moral superiority but dragging himself through mire fit only for a man like Pontius Pilate.

 

I really hope it's not so, however. I may not support McCain myself, but he, of all people, deserves better.

And Mike Huckabee, as a former Christian minister, should know better.

A number of years ago I read a fascinating book by Columbia political scientist Robert Jervis entitled 'System Effects'. One of the book's major premises was that oftentimes policies initiated by governments aimed at ameliorating a specific problem end up having unintended consequences that might cancel whatever positive gains those policies may have been intended to have. One example that I have come across concerns bicycle helmet laws. One study out of Britain a few years ago found out that drivers who passed by bicyclists wearing helmets tended to drive a little less attentively, passing closer to those wearing helmets than those not wearing them. Perhaps subconsciously, automobile drivers felt they could get away with more reckless driving when bicyclists had more protection. But this may translate into a higher incidence of car-bicycle traffic accidents, undoing some or all of the benefit of bicycle helmet laws. 

Or, take Jon Corzine's proposed- arguably massive- toll hike on several major New Jersey roads. At face value, the measure assumes that if X amount of drivers spend Y amount on tolls each year, and, say, that toll is quadrupled, and assuming that X amount of drivers still drive on those roads each year, then the state of New Jersey should end up with 4*Y toll revenue. A welcome bounty for our fiscally irresponsibe state, right?

Well, not exactly. The problem with Corzine's plan is that it assumes that the context within which the toll hikes take effect- what Jervis referred to as the "system"- will remain unchanged even after a new policy is initiated. Or, in the toll example, that the "X" amount of drivers will remain the same. But will it?

Probably not. Since drivers are not mindless automatons, and have choice (a wonderful catch-all word that often confounds economists), they may rationalize that alternative modes of travel may offer as much benefit (for economists, utility), and thus this will reduce "X" by some finite amount.

Translation: fewer drivers are likely to drive on toll roads if the tolls reach a certain high level.

What is that level exactly? Recently, two academics named Peter Swan and Michael Belzer from Ohio's Wayne State University conducted a study of just that question, and found out- no surprise here- that drivers tend to opt for free, non-toll roads when they have an alternative.  In their estimation, a three-fold increase on the Ohio Turnpike would divert about 40% of traffic to "free" roads. In essence, this would mean that the actual revenue the government or toll operator would collect would not be a multiple of 3, but rather something only nearly half as much, about a factor of 1.8.  And this would be on a major highway that is arguably a vital conduit, not simply a minor road that a driver can easily avoid.

Why is this important for New Jerseyans? Well, for one, the major roads that Corzine has targeted- including the New Jersey Turnpike and Garden State Parkway- are not the only modes of transportation across the state. I frequently drive to north New Jersey via the Parkway, but I can instead opt for Route 206, a narrower road that takes me about half an hour longer but that costs me nothing in tolls.

The Wayne State study is very useful because it tracked changes in traffic following changes in tolls, exactly the type of information that might have been useful in Trenton, had our lawmakers been wise enough to consider the unintended consequences of their proposal.

But the consequences don't end with diverted traffic and lost state revenue. Let's consider a hypothetical scenario where traffic on NJ Route 206 increases by some 50% as a result of the Corzine toll plan. Since the road is almost at full capacity during peak hours, this is likely only to increase congestion. Some drivers, of course, might opt back on the Parkway if this happens, but some might find the toll prohibitive (especially once it increases eight-fold) and opt for the free road.  The higher traffic on 206 will mean more problems for local city governments. For example, there may be a higher incidence of traffic accidents and medical emergencies, a direct cost for local governments. Pollution is also likely to increase locally.  More lanes may be added to accomodate the added traffic- damaging the local environment.  All of these unintended consequences have direct financial costs associated with them, which serve to tax local governments. There might be some added local business revenue too, but how much is in question, in particular because commuters are not usually local business patrons (with the notable exception of stopping to buy gas at gas stations). And it is entirely conceivable that the higher cross-municipality commuter traffic will reduce local business patron traffic.

I have already stated in a previous blog on this issue that high tolls may cause businesses to lose revenue and even go out-of-state or into bankruptcy. This is itself an unintended reduction in the tax base.

The basic fact is that a major increase in tolls across New Jersey is likely to bring only a fraction of the estimated revenue to Trenton.  It may even, ultimately, be completely revenue-neutral, if enough drivers are diverted to free roads and costs and economic losses are high enough.

Given that so much is at stake here for so many, wouldn't it have been more responsible for Jon Corzine to look for ways to solve the real problems behind New Jersey's financial woes, in particular its runaway spending? Not addressing the underlying problem may simply facilitate future government fiscal imbalances, on top of the financial costs of such ill-conceived "bandages" as the toll hike proposal.

The hope of an entire nation
a clashing imbroglio attended by fear and
prejudices
Millions of souls disturbed and restless
The fears of horrors yet unknown and
horrors long past
Love and hate inverted and ill
defined
Merged into a cloudy haze of autumnal
sunset
Millions seek answers to questions
but fall on deaf ears, mute
Bully pulpits warmed by spit-polished
shoes stained by flat-pancaked gum
Charlatans do their tap dances,
the public awaits the prestige
Spin-meisters weave their gossamer strings
taught, tight, noose-like wrapped
escape if you can
Repeated many times
Eloquence
Experience
Character
Strength
Wit
Ideas
Change
Who will it be?
Does it really matter?
tap, tap, tap...
spin, spin, spin.
Tell us a little more
we hear you loud and clear
Do that dance for us,
we love it so
Who cares who wins?
I'll have a beer.
 

 

New Jersey Governor Jon Corzine's proposed toll hikes over the next several decades will mean not just higher costs for New Jersey's commuters, but higher costs for a wide range of products that depend on transportation across the Garden State.  While Corzine touts his plan as the only viable "alternative" to debt reduction outside of what he considers to be an unpopular income tax increase, there can be no doubt that the toll hikes will be, in all but name, equivalent to an income tax hike. That tax hike, in turn, is likely to hit New Jersey drivers and business owners hard.

There must be an alternative to this Draconian measure.  Many small businesses already shell out thousands of dollars each year in transportation costs. With oil prices on the rise, a 50% increase every four years on some of New Jersey's most travelled roads might eventually "break the bank" for small business owners, causing some to go into bankruptcy and others to simply leave the state. A result of this might be a shrinking of the tax base- an effect that might completely undo any supposed benefit of the toll hike. Corzine's apologetic reasoning that a lot of the tolls on New Jersey's roads are paid by drivers from out-of-state is no justification for sapping New Jersey's drivers.

As usual, Democratic legislators in New Jersey are not thinking ahead, and, frankly, not thinking at all. New Jersey is in a sad state of affairs not because its tax rates are low (New Jersey has some of the highest local and state tax rates in the nation, as even Corzine admits), but rather because it has nearly spent itself into financial insolvency, much of it on account of corruption. If spending is not brought down, then there can be no justification for toll hikes that outpace the inflation rate by nearly ten-fold. Corzine's reasoning that a bond issue based on the toll hike is likely to impove New Jersey's bond rating avoids the central problem: New Jersey has a relatively poor bond rating (which causes it to shell out more money on public bonds to cover the added "risk") not because it has not raised taxes, but rather because it has spent itself into debt- kind of like a teenger with a wallet full of unpaid credit cards whose credit rating stinks.

While New Jersey's $3 Billion deficit is large, it is no justification for the de facto tax increase that the toll hike represents. Many states have budget deficits that are financed by public borrowing, and while debt financing can reduce the overall amount of money in the budget available for in-state projects (a problem cited by Corzine), it is not an insurmountable problem.  Most economists see this debt as a problem only when the debt-to-GDP ratio is high, because it is the GDP that actually determines the state's ability to pay its debts. The Liberal economist Paul Krugman, in fact, views fears over the debt and deficit as largely unfounded precisely because the United States (and most states within it) are well within their financial means when it comes to the debt-to-GDP ratio. New Jersey is no exception.

The key to reducing the state's deficit and debt is, first, cutting spending, and second, creating a better investment and business environment. A toll hike is a direct tax on businesses, and is likely to literally drive out businesses.

New Jersey's legislators and its governor need to realize that the simple mathematics of debt reduction are often confounded by the unanticipated consequences of long-term private sector taxation. To date, no New Jersey legislator has addressed these long term consequences, and until such time a tax through a toll hike is likely only to exacerbate the problem.

I'd just like to take a moment to post a letter I sent to the folks at USAElectionPolls.com. See, yesterday, on their election numbers-crunching website was posted a bold prediction (which has since disappeared from public view): that Hillary Clinton would lose to Obama by a wide margin, some 20% or so. Well, we all know how that ended up.

So, without further ado..


Dear Sirs:
 
You stated yesterday with near CERTAINTY that Hillary Clinton would not only lose the NH primary, but that she would lose by a BIG margin (you were quoting 10-20% margin, if not higher- seems like that prediction has suspiciously "disappeared" from the site). Oh man, and you guys are number crunchers to boot. See, that's the big problem..
 
 The polls don't always get things right because the people who are polled don't always represent who actually goes to vote (remember all that exit polling "certainty" in the 2004 national election that predicted a Kerry win?). Yes, a whole bunch of polls (a "poll of polls") can reduce sampling error, but all that is irrelevant if the underlying sample does not have some external validity as far as what is actually measured.
 
Numbers aside, Obama's supporters were largely of two kinds: Young Democrats who are typically inspired by the generic and non-specific messages of "hope" and "optimism"- basically modern-day Hippie types who want world peace but have no actual means to accomplish it (I still get a chuckle rolling "the audacity of hope" off my tongue- how about the audacity of being brief and concise?) . The second group is independents, and remember, New Hampshire has open voting for independents. The problem with that is that many times independents don't represent the Democratic voters..they might even be Republican-leaning voters who want to vote against Hillary because they feel she is the greatest threat to the Republican nominee, whoever that may be. Getting Hillary to waste funds in a close contest might be a way to do that. And, New Hampshire has only been "right" in picking the eventual Democratic nominee some 57% of the time. The bottom line is that while NH matters for image, symbolism, and that thing politicians like to call "momentum", isn't THAT important.
 
Now here's why Hillary will beat Obama. Hillary is generally seen as the only candidate who is not only capable to serve as president (sorry, but Obama's just over 3 years in the Senate doesn't cut it) but also the only truly viable (win-capable) nominee. Obama will not beat any Republican candidate except for maybe  Ron Paul. Obama is like the Titanic..fresh, new, seemingly unsinkable..but prone to the smallest and least forseen probems. And those problems will sink his ship eventually. Democrats aren't stupid. Young people are stupid, because they aren't practical, and, let's face it, no national candidate has ever won largely (or solely) on the basis of the young vote.  As Hillary says, even John F. Kennedy, to whom Obama has been compared, had a lot of experience  prior to his run for the White House. 
 
While you guys prominently display ads showing how bad Hillary is faring, she is slowly but surely gaining real momentum. It would take a major breakdown of Dean proportions for her to lose this nomination. Our country isn't at a point in its history that a flash in the pan like Obama will solve our problems, even as appealing and eloquent as he might appear. He's style, but Hillary is substance.
 
Your numbers crunching is useful, but it should be taken with a grain of salt. I'd be more careful about making "predictions" solely based on numbers next time.
 

PS: Yes I am gloating a bit, but I just love when people take their numbers too seriously, especially polls.

By now, all politically astute observers know that Illinois Senator Barack Obama is a rising Democratic star, one who is likely to make a strong showing in the primaries, and one who may even unseat Hillary Clinton as the highest profile Democratic candidate.

But Hillary Clinton is no shrinking violet (her mini-breakdown yesterday aside), and there are good reasons to believe that she can yet win the Democratic nomination- even with a likely New Hampshire loss looming on the austere January horizon.

What is rarely mentioned among the burgeoning crop of political gurus and commentators is that both Iowa and New Hampshire have open systems where independents can vote for either a Republican or Democratic candidate of choice (or both even). This system essentially disengages the traditionally tight link between party loyalists and candidate selection. This means that a Democratic candidate may win in open states even though he or she may actually poll second or even third in polls there among respective party members. This helps to explain why Obama is surging in New Hampshire- not only the first primary state but the first open primary- while actually trailing Clinton among most of the country's Democratic voters.

Now there are two plausible explanations concerning Obama's surge: the explanation more frequently touted in the press is that Obama represents a real change from politics as usual, and that he is a young, vibrant alternative to the tired old Washington partisan deadlock (one cannot emphasize just how powerful the press is in presenting candidates, positively or negatively. In 2000 the press was much more positive towards Bush, and it may have made the difference). There is a lot of validity to this theory: Obama is young- only 46- he is attractive and vibrant, and he speaks in very optimistic, rarely partisan, tones.

But Obama's surge is not entirely due to his overt optimism and the fervor of his supporters. It is likely due, at least in part, to the technical mechanics of the primary system, especially in open or quasi-open primary states like New Hampshire.

Since independents can choose to vote for any candidate of choice- whether Republican, Democrat, or "other"- a politically astute voter can strategically vote for an "enemy" candidate whom they feel is less likely to pose a challenge to one's desired candidate, or who can offer up a greater challenge to one's strongest enemy (sort of the idea that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend"). An example here will better illustrate this phenomenon.

Say I lean conservative but have not decided in favor of a candidate of choice. I am technically independent but lean towards the Republican candidate. Even so, I know I simply do not like one candidate- say Hillary Clinton. I'll vote for anyone- just not her. How would I best make use of my vote?

I can certainly vote for the candidate who most closely represents my interests, possibly Senator McCain, as he is generally centrist but still represents the conservative ideology. I can help McCain win the nomination by voting for him in the primary, but what if I feel that it is more important to just eliminate a worst-of-all-scenarios candidate? I am, after all, not strongly partisan and I probably don't care all that much if, say, a Romney or Huckabee, wins. They seem so similar, in fact, that my benefit hinges probably more on losing less than on winning more.

It is, in essence, a strategic game of payoffs and losses.

A second alternative is to vote for a candidate that may pose a threat to a candidate I do not like and do not want to win.  Many polls, in fact, show that while Hillary still holds onto a majority of Democrats in terms of support, she has high negative numbers, especially among conservatives and independents. If I really really don't want Hillary to win, then one good strategy might be to make life difficult for her by voting for her Democratic opponent, in particular Barack Obama. This will force her to campaign longer, and lose more money in the process, therefore making it both less likely that she wins the nomination, and less strong financially if she does.

Machiavellian to be sure, and possibly beyond the strategic calculus or capability of most voters- but not entirely unlikely. Republicans are known to band together in a "crisis", and most have long known that Hillary was the candidate to beat in 2008 (I remember Rush Limbaugh almost deferentially discussing her future candidacy- a sign that the usually firebrand ideologue took her more seriously than previous candidates Kerry and Gore). And most independents in New Hampshire are not really completely "independent", but actually lean Republican. Voting for Obama may appear as a vote out of spite, but it is actually highly strategic if it pokes holes in Hillary's warship.

In fact, a lot of bloggers in cyberspace have been discussing the apparent contradiction among conservative-leaning independents concerning a linkage between McCain and Obama. While both candidates will likely draw from New Hampshire's pool of independents, the irony is that these two candidates represent nearly polar opposite ideological viewpoints. Obama, for example, is staunchly against the Iraq War, while McCain was a supporter of Bush's troop surge. On nearly every domestic, social, and economic issue they differ fundamentally. And yet, oddly enough, both seem to draw on independent voters? How? Why?

Independent voters are likely frustrated on many levels with politics as usual, and many are simply looking for a new direction, even if that direction is at odds with their issues-oriented leanings. Of the major candidates, only Obama, Huckabee and McCain seem to offer the less partisan approach to politics that appeals to independents.

Undoubtedly some of Obama's independent support represents genuine affinity for the candidate. But some of that may represent more a vote aimed against Hillary Clinton than for him. This reminds me of the fact that support for John Kerry in 2004 was on account of not so much that he was loved, but rather because he was simply not Bush. Voters may not strategize down to an exact science, but they know whom they don't want to win, and quite frequently vote appropriately.

Now there are many big "if's" here. If, for example, Obama appears to gain the upper hand, Hillary's voters may be energized to turn out in large numbers and vote, especially in the closed primaries. It is important to note that New Hampshire and Iowa, combined, represent only a minute fraction of the overall number of all delegates. But if Hillary loses enough momentum- and it is perceived that she is DOA (frightful reminders of Dean)- then she may lose sufficient votes- especially by February 5's super primary- to no longer be viable. Getting Hillary defeated early in the primary season (however unlikely) would be a  Republican's dream, as Obama, however fresh and inspiring he may appear, is seen as too untested nationally by a large cross-section of the voting public.

Whatever the case may be, history has shown that New Hampshire "correctly" chooses the Democratic nominee only about 57% of the time.  Moreover, the state does not represent a large cross-section of the country (it is, traditionally, more New England liberal- just the type of state to vote strongly in favor of Obama), and functionally represents only a small fraction of delegates. And finally, it is an open primary state, meaning that a Democratic (or Republican) "winner" may not be the actual candidate of choice of that party, as independents can vote for either (or both) party.

So much for New Hampshire. I'll take a wait-and-see approach, and watch closely, especially on February 5. I won't count Hillary out yet, even if she (likely) loses today.

This year's election is turning out to be one of the most exciting in decades.

A Preliminary Caveat: Political predictions tend to leave just a slightly more bitter taste in one's mouth than pedestrian opinions: not only are they largely subjective and infused with the political flavor of one's choosing, but they often leave one scrambling for a viable palliative on the "Monday" after the game.  Opinions, as Plato might say, are not ideal forms: There is no ultimate truth to them.

Even so, I believe that there are a few good reasons to believe that Hillary Clinton will be the next President of the United States. And I say this knowing full well that she is not liked on a personal level even by many of her supporters. If George W. Bush won the 2000 (arguably?) and 2004 elections on the fact that he is the type of guy one would want to have a beer with, then Hillary is the type of woman you'd want to exchange a few cursory, not entirely informal, pleasantries with at a wine and cheese party. A forced smile, a handshake, and you move on, it's that sort of personal level with Hillary.

But the fact that she has gained so much support and continues to hold onto it despite not being a very warm and outwardly affectionate human being may say more about Hillary's true viability as a candidate than anything else. She must be doing some things right to have such a large base of support, with such an awkward public persona and so much personal baggage to boot. Having climbed far, no doubt owing in large measure to her much more well-liked husband, she has shown that a hard work ethic and a commitment to social causes sometimes offer more appeal than the un-appeal of a dry and sangfroid personality. And she is, indeed, the real deal, not just a highly polished and suave politician.

In fact, most great public officials have been known more for their hard work ethic and effectiveness than for their looks (JKF excepted). I tend to have a rule of thumb that the better looking the politician, the more likely he or she is vapid, dull, and cookie-cutter. I don't mean to imply that someone like a Romney or an Obama- both Harvard Law grads- are vapid and dull. They are not. But there is often a lack of substance that pervades an all-too-polished politician, who does not pull himself up by his bootstraps but looks out and usually down towards an audience of infatuated admirers (and who often attracts the younger crowds, more apt to accept the sheer energy and sex drive of the vibrant superstar politician, the hot new thing).  Too slick and polished is sometimes too good to be true.

Hillary is not of that variety of politician. Though she is by no means unattractive physically, either, she is by no means a "looker".  And if we were to go by historical presidential statures (most of which hover around the six foot mark), she isn't even that tall (she is of average height for a woman, but at 5'5" she is the shortest cadidate, Dennis Kucinich being perhaps just slightly taller).  She's a workhorse in the style of a Truman or a Goldwater (the latter whom, incidentally, she worked for as a teenager with early political aspirations). And Like a Truman or a Goldwater, she is not always too likeable; but she is generally respected. Respect, in politics, often carries with it more weight than overblown rhetorical appeals that tend to cater more to pundits than constituencies.

This season's crop of candidates is wide but in large measure shallow. While we have probably the most diverse swath of social, religious, and racial backgrounds (we have, for the first time, a viable African American and a female candidate, a Mexican American, and a Mormon), the platforms tend to typify the general thrust of ideologies from the respective parties. The Republican candidates, for example, tend to all agree on the need for strong defense and a continued troop presence in Iraq, while focusing less energy on such typically progressive issues like health care, the environment, education and energy independence, the champion causes of Democrats.  Were it not for an occasional ad hominem or personal attack regarding a long-ago faux pas or personal mis-step (such as Romney hiring a landscaping company that hired "illegal" immigrant labor or Giuliani's much publicized marital infidelity), we might think that there is no real difference between the Republican aspirants. 

The Democrats for their own part symbolize slightly greater divergence of opinion (Edwards, for example, has tried to cast himself as the candidate for the working middle class, while Obama represents the upwardly mobile branch, the much maligned "champagne" Liberal establishment, although he tries a little too hard to dispel that idea). Kucinich, probably the most genuine representative of working class America, is not really a viable candidate, unfortunately. For the most part, the Democratic ticket is a race between Hillary and the polished Obama and Edwards. All, incidentally, are lawyers.

But Hillary brings with her not only experience, but the kind of bread-and-butter realism that the Democratic party is frequently devoid of. She cannot use the sex appeal of her husband, who did well in addressing middle class issues in his run sixteen years ago. But she has the same interest in addressing what matters to voters, especially at a time when economic issues are coming to the fore. In fact, Bill Clinton might have lost his first campaign were it not the case that the heady pomp and patriotism of the first Gulf War had subsided just in time for the voting public to realize that domestic issues were not being addressed (by a president so far removed from them that he could not tell the price of milk or bread). It seems like the same events are happening now, in an eerie way a deja vu of sorts: an unpopular Bush waging a war in Iraq, the economy beginning to show its wear, a Clinton talking about what matters to working people.

The polls in recent months have shown that Hillary is no longer the shoe-in Democratic candidate of one year ago and that Obama and even Edwards can yet chisel away at her lead. She may even lose in Iowa and New Hampshire come January. But her own husband showed that these two inaugural states are often not as important as getting a clear and believable message out. People may care for who wins a primary- it's always good PR- but that early bump pales in comparison to the power of rational contemplation- a singular, one voter-at-a-time process- about who is likely to get the job done once in office. 

Among working Americans and seniors alike, Hillary consistently comes up as the definitive winner because she has worked for issues that matter for them and this lends her the most credibility. Obama, for all his merits, has a very brief record as a national politician, and while he often comes off as highly inspiring with references to words like "hopes" and "dreams", he falls short on substance or specifics. Edwards, too, suffers from this image, even though he has promised more concrete change. Edwards' real problem is that he looks like a just slightly more erudite Dan Quayle.

If John Kerry's (lest we forget that bumbling stentorian) failed 2004 run proved anything, it is that highly charged issues often tend to backfire. Patriotism is always going to win out against idealism in a time of war, but when economic issues unite us, references to patriotism look quaint and Lee Greenwood-ish. Americans can afford to go on symbolism and style over substance in times of prosperity, but they'd much rather talk about "what will you do for me" when livelihoods and financial security is at stake (People often debate whether so-called "domestic" or "foreign" politics matter more, but even in a time of war the livelihoods of people are affected to a much greater extent by economics than the shadow of war. War is often the veil underneath which all sorts of miscreants push forth self-serving agendas. We fight them over there so we don't fight them here, sure, but what about the economy, stupid?).

 Hillary Clinton represents a little of every part of America. She was born in the midwest but has lived in the south and now represents a state in the northeast. She came from a modest background and worked her way up by verve, passion, and intelligence. She may never get huge laughs with her sometimes resultingly off-color attempts at humor (such as trying to sound African-American or southern at respective African-American and southern audiences). Her campaign ads try to make her look softer and gentler- a female Obama or Edwards- but the result is that she often looks more stiff and awkward than before- that forced smile echoing in one's memories like the nightmarish laugh of the Joker (frequently over-dubbed on YouTube).

Hillary Clinton is not a politician with the star qualities of her husband, and she will not win the presidency if she focuses her energies on resurrecting his image. She is her own woman, and she will do well if she proves this by holding firm on issues like economics, health care, and education.  Unlike some of her fellow candidates, she is not campaigning as an anti-war candidate, partly because she voted to authorize the Iraq war, but also partly because she strategically realizes that that issue has had its heyday.  John Kerry showed that having a stance against something but failing to stand for something is a losing effort. Somewhat like Bill, she does try to play to issues of concern to both sides of the political aisle, being Conservative on some issues- like her departure from universal amnesty for illegal immigrants- but traditionally Liberal on others. Her ability to stand generally in the middle politically will attract quite a few independent voters and possibly even a few Republicans- who may dislike her personally but respect her politically.

 Camelot Hillary's marriage is not, but neither was JFK's. It is much closer to the relationship between FDR and Eleanor, a working relationship forged on great political, if not personal, devotion. And like Eleanor, Hillary more than makes up for her oratorial and social awkwardness with her passion and commitment to issues of social relevance.

 Americans have proven that while they are often polarized on rhetorical issues, such as God, gun control and terrorism, they realize that sometimes only a hard-working Liberal will fight for them. Republicans are great when the economy is good, but fail to address middle-class issues during rough economic spells (the Bush capital gains tax cuts, in my opinion, were better for Wall Street than for the average working American, and statistics bear out the fact that the discrepancy between the rich and poor is growing wider). 

 So while I make my prediction with one finger half crossed, and being ready to swallow the bitter pill that comes with so many predictions gone bad, I believe that there is a good chance that Hillary Clinton will be the next President of the United States.

She is, indeed, the best woman for the job, and I say this not because I want to praise her as a paragon of excellence as a woman, but because she bests all her male competitors so fundamentally where the real issues matter.

 

'The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy', written by Professors Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, is perhaps the most controversial analysis of American-Israeli relations in a very long time. It is probably more controversial than former President Jimmy Carter's, 'Palestine: Peace not Apartheid', which was much-debated, and maligned, in the press last year. Likewise, Walt and Mearsheimer have faced stiff criticism both from within the halls of academia (for example, a Harvard University seal was removed from a preliminary working paper) and from the media (take your pick of any major U.S. newspaper that has run editorials and even ads critical of the book). Just recently, Abraham Foxman, the head of the Anti-Defamation Leage, has come out with a book denouncing 'The Israel Lobby' as a "myth", and even Barnes and Noble has touted Foxman's critical book as a "myth breaker" in its e-mail flyers.

Having read both the working paper and the longer book, I can state that the argument in favor of the so-called "Israel Lobby" being the most important source of influence on American foreign policy is suggestive, but not water tight. Most criticism of the book has, in fact, revolved around the debate on just how influential that "lobby" is, with critics arguing that 1. The Israel lobby is just as legal and "democratic" as any other lobby in Washington. 2. American diplomats and decision makers are not pre-programmed to monolithically support Israel, regardless of context and world events.

Both counter-arguments are valid, but they are anticipated by the authors. In fact, the authors do not claim that the Israel "lobby" has no right to exist; nor do they claim that American foreign policy shirks or ignores its strategic interest in favor of Israel's best interests. However, the authors do claim that the policies followed by American decision-makers would be radically different were it not for the influence of that "lobby". That is, rather than viewing decisions as relfecting nearly one-to-one concurrence with Israel's interests, the authors argue that America's polices are often highly skewed by the domestic influences of the lobby. Since both authors are scholars of the neorealist school, one that views national interests as paramount in the decisions and decision processes of states, throwing the domestic lobbying wrench in the mechanism creates a natural source of scholarly interest for the two. For the neorealist, the domestic lobbying skews the national interest, and that can undermine decision-making at the national level.

Of course, the same argument- that private lobbying interests skew decisions in the public interest- can be made for any powerful lobby such as the AARP. But the difference that Walt and Mearsheimer imply is that while a national-level lobby like the AARP can influence domestic legislation, it does not influence foreign policy. And while there are non-pro-Israel foreign policy lobbies, none of them can muster anywhere near the political clout, influence, and fundraising ability that the Israel lobby can. To entirely ignore this fact would be naive for any analyst of Middle-East affairs.

Unfortunately, Walt and Mearsheimer's forte is not lobbying or lobbying politics, a weakness that invites the type of criticism that is now prominent in so many newspapers. While the book is clearly well-documented and well-researched (each chapter alone has hundreds of meticulous references and footnotes), it suffers because it does not focus greater attention upon the supposed causal links between lobbying efforts and policy decisions. For example, in order to definitively show that the 2003 war in Iraq was mainly caused by the influence of the Israeli lobby (an argument advanced in the book), the authors would have had to present more than merely anecdotal or suggestive evidence. With little first-hand analysis of the type obtained by an author like Bob Woodward in his three books on the recent "war on terror", and without the ability to prove that counter-arguments are not valid (such as disproving Bush's claim that Saddam was an imminent threat), the argument simply remains a plausible yet unproven (or falsifiable) fragmentary theory.

But almost all arguments or even quasi-arguments have some degree of plausibility, and it behooves the scholar to eliminate competing theories if he is to stake a claim to explanatory prominence. It is no surprise, then, that so much criticism revolves around this issue.

Walt and Mearsheimer's book, however, does underscore a disturbing phenomenon, which is well-documented in the book: the lack of a true debate among both scholars and policy-makers on the Israeli-Palestine conflict. The extreme irony, which Walt and Mearsheimer likewise underscore, is that in Israel today there is a more lively debate about the conflict than there is in the United States. While in the United States few articles, op-ed pieces, or scholarly or institutional tomes present criticisms of Israel's policies towards Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements in disputed territories, and the Israeli IDF's frequent incursions into those lands, in Israel a significant amount of scholarship and reporting does.

In fact, this latter, largely Liberal perspective is frequently highly critical of government policies, and takes a more balanced view of the treatment of Palestinians. Of course, this does not mean that there is support in Israel for terrorism. But there is not that "knee-jerk" tendency to equate Palestinian desires for national independence with terrorism, one that is either implicitly or explicitly made in many mainstream American publications.

I also find it problematic that many pro-Israel organizations go beyond merely lobbying policy-makers, and resort to personal attacks by labelling opponents as "anti-Semitic".  Even Walt and Mearsheimer have been labeled as anti-Semites, an accusation that is hard to sustain. These are the types of tactics that, while technically protected to some degree under a democracy, are anathema to the spirit of free debate and the free exchange of ideas. It is one thing to lobby a Congressman in favor of policies you desire, and quite another to threaten the Congressman with the "A-S" label if he does not do as you please. Of course, it might be overstating the case that threats are a major "modus" by which the lobby works (This suggestion reminds one of a "Mafia"). But I do agree with Walt and Mearsheimer that there is presently no effective Palestinian "lobby", nor viewpoint, in mainstream American media. This alone should suggest that the news is a bit biased, in the very least, in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

For example, while most European national publications and the United Nations harshly criticized Israel's 2006 invasion of Lebanon and Gaza (nearly 1000 Lebanese civilians died, as compared with less than 100 Israelis), most American publications highlighted the death and destruction in Israel. The Lebanese and Palestinians were given, at most, a cursory glance. Even though thousands of residential buildings, and almost all major bridges, roads, and airports, were damaged or destroyed in Lebanon, American newspapers predominantly discussed the plight of a few hundred Israeli refugees living in northern Israel. Almost no mention was made of the humanitarian crisis created in Lebanon and Gaza. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, French ships attempting to rescue French nationals and other affected civiiians faced a strong naval blockade. Since both the air and sea routes were effectively blocked by Israel's IDF, thousands of refugees began crossing the border into nearby Syria, or were packed into refugee camps, highly reminiscent of Darfur.

Yet despite all of this, American newspapers gave the impression that Israel was simply carrying out a defensive operation against Hizbollah, a terrorist group influenced by Syrian and Iranian support. It is little wonder why most Americans, when polled, failed to see the imbalance in Israel's "defensive" operations, which were initially launched in order to rescue, ostensibly, three Israeli soldiers that had been kidnapped by Hizbollah.

While the definitive argument that the Israel lobby alone is the "casus" for American Mid-East policy falls short of what the book's title might suggest, one can justifiably argue that America's policies reflect a decidedly pro-Israel view, one that is further bolstered by a pro-Israel press.

Ultimately, the greatest limitation to any free society is a biased press. A free press is the watchdog of government, and as such it provides the public vital information by which to judge the actions of elected representatives. The highly contentious debate on Israel that is happening today is an important one, but it is somewhat late in coming. The fact that there has not been a debate thus far, on an issue of such vital national importance, is puzzling. Why are critics of Israel so reguarly and prominenty labeled anti-Semitic, as if to create the impression that a debate about international strategy is somehow racist or odious in nature?

It strikes me that almost always, those who fear openness tend to label opponents in such a way as to silence any possibility of openness. By analogy, opponents of the Iraq War, upon being labeled un-patriotic, are quickly silenced and ostracized. Debate about the war soon devolves into a shouting match on one's patriotic credentials. In this case, truth is often the first victim.

I find it more productive for both sides to welcome a lively debate as a means to encourage understanding. In opening the doors to debate, those who have unwaveringly supported pro-Israel policies can signal that their interest is not shrouded in mystery. After all, there is nothing un-democratic about supporting a cause of personal interest. But neither should those who champion a cause denounce opponents by resorting to labels, public embarassment or ostracism. This evokes imagery that is decidedly less democratic in spirit.