af40's Blog

'The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy', written by Professors Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer, is perhaps the most controversial analysis of American-Israeli relations in a very long time. It is probably more controversial than former President Jimmy Carter's, 'Palestine: Peace not Apartheid', which was much-debated, and maligned, in the press last year. Likewise, Walt and Mearsheimer have faced stiff criticism both from within the halls of academia (for example, a Harvard University seal was removed from a preliminary working paper) and from the media (take your pick of any major U.S. newspaper that has run editorials and even ads critical of the book). Just recently, Abraham Foxman, the head of the Anti-Defamation Leage, has come out with a book denouncing 'The Israel Lobby' as a "myth", and even Barnes and Noble has touted Foxman's critical book as a "myth breaker" in its e-mail flyers.

Having read both the working paper and the longer book, I can state that the argument in favor of the so-called "Israel Lobby" being the most important source of influence on American foreign policy is suggestive, but not water tight. Most criticism of the book has, in fact, revolved around the debate on just how influential that "lobby" is, with critics arguing that 1. The Israel lobby is just as legal and "democratic" as any other lobby in Washington. 2. American diplomats and decision makers are not pre-programmed to monolithically support Israel, regardless of context and world events.

Both counter-arguments are valid, but they are anticipated by the authors. In fact, the authors do not claim that the Israel "lobby" has no right to exist; nor do they claim that American foreign policy shirks or ignores its strategic interest in favor of Israel's best interests. However, the authors do claim that the policies followed by American decision-makers would be radically different were it not for the influence of that "lobby". That is, rather than viewing decisions as relfecting nearly one-to-one concurrence with Israel's interests, the authors argue that America's polices are often highly skewed by the domestic influences of the lobby. Since both authors are scholars of the neorealist school, one that views national interests as paramount in the decisions and decision processes of states, throwing the domestic lobbying wrench in the mechanism creates a natural source of scholarly interest for the two. For the neorealist, the domestic lobbying skews the national interest, and that can undermine decision-making at the national level.

Of course, the same argument- that private lobbying interests skew decisions in the public interest- can be made for any powerful lobby such as the AARP. But the difference that Walt and Mearsheimer imply is that while a national-level lobby like the AARP can influence domestic legislation, it does not influence foreign policy. And while there are non-pro-Israel foreign policy lobbies, none of them can muster anywhere near the political clout, influence, and fundraising ability that the Israel lobby can. To entirely ignore this fact would be naive for any analyst of Middle-East affairs.

Unfortunately, Walt and Mearsheimer's forte is not lobbying or lobbying politics, a weakness that invites the type of criticism that is now prominent in so many newspapers. While the book is clearly well-documented and well-researched (each chapter alone has hundreds of meticulous references and footnotes), it suffers because it does not focus greater attention upon the supposed causal links between lobbying efforts and policy decisions. For example, in order to definitively show that the 2003 war in Iraq was mainly caused by the influence of the Israeli lobby (an argument advanced in the book), the authors would have had to present more than merely anecdotal or suggestive evidence. With little first-hand analysis of the type obtained by an author like Bob Woodward in his three books on the recent "war on terror", and without the ability to prove that counter-arguments are not valid (such as disproving Bush's claim that Saddam was an imminent threat), the argument simply remains a plausible yet unproven (or falsifiable) fragmentary theory.

But almost all arguments or even quasi-arguments have some degree of plausibility, and it behooves the scholar to eliminate competing theories if he is to stake a claim to explanatory prominence. It is no surprise, then, that so much criticism revolves around this issue.

Walt and Mearsheimer's book, however, does underscore a disturbing phenomenon, which is well-documented in the book: the lack of a true debate among both scholars and policy-makers on the Israeli-Palestine conflict. The extreme irony, which Walt and Mearsheimer likewise underscore, is that in Israel today there is a more lively debate about the conflict than there is in the United States. While in the United States few articles, op-ed pieces, or scholarly or institutional tomes present criticisms of Israel's policies towards Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlements in disputed territories, and the Israeli IDF's frequent incursions into those lands, in Israel a significant amount of scholarship and reporting does.

In fact, this latter, largely Liberal perspective is frequently highly critical of government policies, and takes a more balanced view of the treatment of Palestinians. Of course, this does not mean that there is support in Israel for terrorism. But there is not that "knee-jerk" tendency to equate Palestinian desires for national independence with terrorism, one that is either implicitly or explicitly made in many mainstream American publications.

I also find it problematic that many pro-Israel organizations go beyond merely lobbying policy-makers, and resort to personal attacks by labelling opponents as "anti-Semitic".  Even Walt and Mearsheimer have been labeled as anti-Semites, an accusation that is hard to sustain. These are the types of tactics that, while technically protected to some degree under a democracy, are anathema to the spirit of free debate and the free exchange of ideas. It is one thing to lobby a Congressman in favor of policies you desire, and quite another to threaten the Congressman with the "A-S" label if he does not do as you please. Of course, it might be overstating the case that threats are a major "modus" by which the lobby works (This suggestion reminds one of a "Mafia"). But I do agree with Walt and Mearsheimer that there is presently no effective Palestinian "lobby", nor viewpoint, in mainstream American media. This alone should suggest that the news is a bit biased, in the very least, in regards to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

For example, while most European national publications and the United Nations harshly criticized Israel's 2006 invasion of Lebanon and Gaza (nearly 1000 Lebanese civilians died, as compared with less than 100 Israelis), most American publications highlighted the death and destruction in Israel. The Lebanese and Palestinians were given, at most, a cursory glance. Even though thousands of residential buildings, and almost all major bridges, roads, and airports, were damaged or destroyed in Lebanon, American newspapers predominantly discussed the plight of a few hundred Israeli refugees living in northern Israel. Almost no mention was made of the humanitarian crisis created in Lebanon and Gaza. Meanwhile, in Lebanon, French ships attempting to rescue French nationals and other affected civiiians faced a strong naval blockade. Since both the air and sea routes were effectively blocked by Israel's IDF, thousands of refugees began crossing the border into nearby Syria, or were packed into refugee camps, highly reminiscent of Darfur.

Yet despite all of this, American newspapers gave the impression that Israel was simply carrying out a defensive operation against Hizbollah, a terrorist group influenced by Syrian and Iranian support. It is little wonder why most Americans, when polled, failed to see the imbalance in Israel's "defensive" operations, which were initially launched in order to rescue, ostensibly, three Israeli soldiers that had been kidnapped by Hizbollah.

While the definitive argument that the Israel lobby alone is the "casus" for American Mid-East policy falls short of what the book's title might suggest, one can justifiably argue that America's policies reflect a decidedly pro-Israel view, one that is further bolstered by a pro-Israel press.

Ultimately, the greatest limitation to any free society is a biased press. A free press is the watchdog of government, and as such it provides the public vital information by which to judge the actions of elected representatives. The highly contentious debate on Israel that is happening today is an important one, but it is somewhat late in coming. The fact that there has not been a debate thus far, on an issue of such vital national importance, is puzzling. Why are critics of Israel so reguarly and prominenty labeled anti-Semitic, as if to create the impression that a debate about international strategy is somehow racist or odious in nature?

It strikes me that almost always, those who fear openness tend to label opponents in such a way as to silence any possibility of openness. By analogy, opponents of the Iraq War, upon being labeled un-patriotic, are quickly silenced and ostracized. Debate about the war soon devolves into a shouting match on one's patriotic credentials. In this case, truth is often the first victim.

I find it more productive for both sides to welcome a lively debate as a means to encourage understanding. In opening the doors to debate, those who have unwaveringly supported pro-Israel policies can signal that their interest is not shrouded in mystery. After all, there is nothing un-democratic about supporting a cause of personal interest. But neither should those who champion a cause denounce opponents by resorting to labels, public embarassment or ostracism. This evokes imagery that is decidedly less democratic in spirit.